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COMMENTS
ANNULMENT OF THE WEDDING DECISION: STATUTORY
REVISION TO EXTEND USE OF FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
IN HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS
Finding a conflict between the two controlling statutes, the Su-
preme Court in Wingo v. Wedding' frustrated an attempt to alle-
viate court congestion in disallowing the use of federal magistrates
for hearing evidence concerning habeas corpus petitions. The Court
reasoned that the Federal Magistrates Act 2 was not consistent with,
nor had it displaced, the requirement of section 2243 of the Judicial
Code" that "courts ... hear and determine the facts"4 in habeas
proceedings. Strongly dissenting, Chief Justice Burger declared:
"[Niow that the Court has construed the Magistrates Act contrary
to a clear legislative intent, it is for the Congress to act to restate
its intentions if its declared objectives are to be carried out."5 To
comply with the Chief Justice's suggestion to remove statutory re-
strictions upon the conduct of habeas evidentiary hearings by mag-
istrates,6 however, Congress must provide a procedure that also will
avoid constitutional limitations derived from article III.
In Wedding the United States District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky had promulgated a local rule7 which allowed
magistrates in its jurisdiction to hold evidentiary hearings pursuant
to section 6368 of the Federal Magistrates Act. Besides the specific
powers prescribed by section 636(a),9 section 636(b) permits district
1. 94 S. Ct. 2842 (1974).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39 (1970).
3. Id. § 2243.
4. Id.
5. 94 S. Ct. at 2856 (Burger, C.J., & White, J., dissenting).
6. See also Note, Proposed Reformation of Federal Habeas Corpus Procedure: Use of Fed-
eral Magistrates, 54 IowA L. Rnv. 1147, 1158 (1969).
7. W.D. Ky. R. 16(c)(3), as amended W.D. Ky. R. 14(e). The rule allowed the magistrate
to conduct and record electronically evidentiary hearings on those petitions deemed worthy
of such consideration. Subsequent to the hearing the magistrate was to file a report and make
a recommendation to the district judge, who, upon request, was required to listen to the
recording and give it de novo consideration. Id.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1970).
9. Section 636(a) states that within his prescribed jurisdiction a magistrate has the follow-
ing powers:
(1) all powers and duties conferred or imposed upon United States commis-
sioners by law or by the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States
District Courts;
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courts to establish local rules delegating to federal magistrates addi-
tional duties "not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States."" One additional duty suggested in subsection
636(b)(3) is the "preliminary review of applications for post-trial
relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses," ' , such
review being only for the purpose of recommending to the district
judge whether to hold a hearing on the application.' 2 Reading this
section in conjunction with the overall time-saving purpose of the
Magistrates Act, the Wedding district court promulgated a rule
(2) the power to administer oaths and affirmations, impose conditions of
release under section 3146 of title 18, and take acknowledgements, affidavits,
and depositions; and
(3) the power to conduct trials under section 3401, title 18, United States
Code, in conformity with and subject to the limitations of that section.
Id. § 636(a).
10. Section 636(b) provides:
Any district court of the United States, by the concurrence of a majority of all
of the judges of such district court, may establish rules pursuant to which any
full-time United States magistrate, or, where there is no full-time magistrate
reasonably available, any part-time magistrate specially designated by the
court, may be assigned within the territorial jurisdiction of such court such
additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States. The additional duties authorized by rule may include, but are
not restricted to-
(1Y service as a special master in an appropriate civil action, pursuant
to the applicable provisions of this title and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for the United States district courts;
(2) assistance to a district judge in the conduct of pretrial or discovery
proceedings in civil or criminal actions; and
(3) preliminary review of applications for post-trial relief made by indi-
viduals convicted of criminal offenses, and submission of a report and
recommendations to facilitate the decision of the district judge having
jurisdiction over the case as to whether there should be a hearing.
Id. § 636(b).
The exact limits placed on magisterial authority are intentionally vague perhaps due to
the congressional desire that the magistrate be used for a variety of fundtions. The Senate
Committee on the Judiciary asserted:
It seems unwise to. . .require that the district courts give magistrates duties
other than those traditionally performed by commissioners. It is hoped, how-
ever, that in their discretion the district courts will find it useful to lighten their
own burden ....
If district judges are willing to experiment with the assignment to magistrates
of other functions in aid of the business of the courts. . . there will be increased
time available to judges for the careful and unhurried performance of their vital
and traditional adjudicatory duties, and a consequent benefit to both the effi-
ciency and quality of justice in the Federal courts.
S. REP. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1967) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1970).
12. Id.
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permitting a magistrate to hold the hearing and record it electroni-
cally. 13 The recording of the proceedings and the magistrate's find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law were to be submitted to the
federal district judge for him to adopt those findings or make his
own regarding the merits of the habeas petition.1 4
Examining the validity of the local rule, the Supreme Court first
noted the historical importance of "the 'great constitutional privi-
lege' of habeas corpus,"', then looked at recent changes to section
2243 of the habeas corpus statute,5 which provided procedures for
exercise of the "privilege." Finding no substantive change in the
requirement that "court[s] shall summarily hear and determine
the facts" in habeas proceedings, 7 the Court relied upon prior cases
which had denied United States commissioners, the predecessors of
magistrates, the power to hold evidentiary hearings in federal ha-
beas corpus proceedings. 8 Determining from such precedent that
magistrates were not to be included within the meaning of the term
"court," the Court concluded that magistrates could not hold evi-
dentiary hearings without a further specific authorization from Con-
gress. 9
13. W.D. Ky. R. 16(c)(3), as amended W.D. Ky. R. 14(e).
14. Id.
15. 94 S. Ct. at 2847, quoting Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970).
17. Id. Congress originally provided "that either of the justices of the supreme court, as
well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the
purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1
Stat. 82. The 1867 revision to the habeas corpus procedure provided: "The said court or judge
shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing testimony and
the arguments of the parties interested. . . ... Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385, 386.
A later revision was more explicit, providing: "The court, or justice, or judge shall proceed
in a summary way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing the testimony and arguments
... ." Act of June 28, 1874, ch. 13, § 761, 18 Stat. 142 (Rev. Stat. § 761).
When this provision was again revised in 1948, similar language was retained in the initial
sentence of the section: "A court, justice or judge. . . shall. . . award the writ. . . ."Act
of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2243, 62 Stat. 965 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970)). The last
sentence of the section, which deals with the manner of taking evidence, merely states: "The
court shall summarily hear and determine the facts. ... Id. (emphasis supplied). Since
there were no indications from legislative history that anything more than a mere change of
form was intended, the Supreme Court in Wedding determined that the meaning of the term
"court" as used in the last sentence of section 2243 could not be deemed to include the term
"magistrate." 94 S. Ct. at 2847-48.
18. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952);
Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342 (1941).
19. 94 S. Ct. at 2848. The Court stated: "Our inquiry is thus narrowed to the question
whether the Federal Magistrates Act changed the requirement of § 2243 that federal judges
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Review of the legislative history of the magistrate legislation re-
vealed to the Court a reluctance on the part of Congress to establish
habeas corpus evidentiary proceedings either as a particular power
or as an additional duty assignable to federal magistrates, 2 this
reluctance stemming from congressional fear that the assignment of
such a duty would be an unconstitutional delegation of judicial
power. 2' Having concluded that federal habeas corpus proceedings
personally conduct habeas corpus evidentiary hearings." Id.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Wedding, only the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit had construed the section as not permitting magistrates to conduct habeas corpus
evidentiary hearings. Wedding v. Wingo, 483 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1973). Four other circuit
courts reached contrary conclusions. O'Shea v. United States, 491 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1974)
(judge to give no weight, however, to a magistrate's finding to which a party objected);
Noorlander v. Ciccone, 489 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Gonzalez v. Zelker,
477 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1973) (where factfinding not dispositive); Parnell v. Wainwright, 464
F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1972) (factual conclusions adopted by district court to be accepted unless
clearly erroneous). With the exception of Noorlander, see notes 59-68 infra & accompanying
text, little reasoning accompanied the conclusions of these four courts. A brief discussion in
Parnell upheld the magistrate's power with the statement: "The findings of a magistrate in
a postconviction remedies case, when adopted by the district court are akin to the findings
of a special master whose findings are likewise adopted by the court." 464 F.2d at 763. Such
reasoning apparently looks to provision 636(b)(1), which allows the magistrate to serve as a
special master, see note 10 supra, for primary support in permitting magistrates to conduct
evidentiary hearings. Equating magistrates in habeas proceedings to special masters may be
dubious, however, because such a comparison erroneously assumes that the same procedural
protections apply in both situations. Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides in pertinent part: "The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts
them, shall be considered as the findings of the court." Ample authority, however, has
dictated that reference to a master is impermissible in a habeas corpus proceeding. See
Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342 (1941); Payne v. Wingo, 442 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1971); 9
C. WIGr & A. MILR, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PRocDnuRE § 2602, at 778 (1971). Further, rule
53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: "A reference to a master shall be the
exception and not the rule." In interpreting this rule the Supreme Court has held that
calendar congestion is not such an "exceptional circumstance." La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.,
352 U.S. 249, 259 (1957). Therefore, the regular use of magistrates to perform essentially as
special masters in habeas proceedings may be objectionable. The Parnell reasoning perhaps
could remain viable on the basis that the magistrate is a more highly qualified judicial officer
than the master, and therefore in his capacity as special master, the magistrate need not be
limited by restrictions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure placed upon masters appointed
on a one-time basis. Such an argument may be utilized in other situations under section
636(b)(1), but as a result of Wedding the analogy to the special master in Parnell is insuffi-
cient to permit magistrates to conduct evidentiary hearings in habeas corpus proceedings.
20. 94 S. Ct. at 2848-49.
21. Section 636(b)(3), see note 10 supra, originally provided that the magistrate could give
"preliminary consideration of applications for post-trial relief made by individuals convicted
of criminal offenses." S. 3475, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 636(b)(3) (1966). This section was later
restricted because it delegated to magistrates ultimate decisionmaking duties. See also notes
27-32 infra & accompanying text.
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require a judge to hear and determine facts in habeas petitions and
that the Magistrates Act had not displaced this statutory require-
ment, the Court held that the additional duty conferred by the local
court rule was "inconsistent with the . .. laws of the United
States."rs For Congress to achieve its goal of easing the burden of
habeas petitions upon district courts following the Wedding deci-
sion, it must at a minimum alter the "laws of the United States"
to avoid inconsistency between those laws and the magistrate hear-
ing rules.
Several considerations support the acceptance by Congress of
Chief Justice Burger's invitation to restate its intentions in order to
attain its objectives. The overall purpose of the Federal Magistrate's
Act was to replace an inefficient commissioner system with a class
of highly qualified federal judicial officerss possessing a broader
22. 94 S. Ct. at 2849, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1970).
23. The magistrate is to be appointed by a majority of the judges in the district in which
he is to serve, 28 U.S.C. § 631(a), if judged "competent to perform the duties of the office"
by the appointing judges, id. § 631(b)(2); he also is to be a member of the bar in good
standing, id. § 631(b)(1), to serve for a term of years, id. § 631(e), subject to removal for
incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability, id. § 631(h). The
salary provided, see id. § 634(a), is set with a view towards attracting highly qualified individ-
uals, see H.R. REP. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1968) [hereinafter cited as HousE
REPoRT]. Nepotism is avoided by disqualifying for office any person related by marriage or
blood to a judge of the appointing court, id. § 631(b)(4).
The House committee report explains the purpose behind this upgrading:
An upgraded system of judicial officers below the level of the district judge can
provide significant advantages for the Federal judicial system. By raising the
standards of the lowest judicial office and by increasing the scope of responsibili-
ties that can be discharged by that office, the system will be made capable of
increasing the overall efficiency of the Federal judiciary, while at the same time
providing a higher standard of justice at the point where many individuals first
come into contact with the courts.
Houss REPoRT, supra at 14. For a discussion of the inadequacies existing under the previous
commissioner system, see id. at 13-14; Clark, Parajudges and the Administration of Justice,
24 VAND. L. Rv. 1167, 1175-76 (1971); Shafroth, Off with the Old, On with the New, 55
A.B.A.J. 32 (1969).
Among the more notable defects in the commissioner system abolished by the Magistrates
Act was the anachronistic fee system of compensation whereby commissioners were paid
according to functions performed up to a statutory ceiling. Such a system was of questionable
constitutionality, since it arguably afforded the commissioners, as judicial officers, pecuniary
interests in the controversies over which they presided. The Supreme Court has held such
pecuniary interests violative of due process. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). Not only
did the commissioner system lack rigorous standards of appointment and provide only a low
maximum salary, the system used to determine salaries also resulted in particularly dispro-
portionate undercompensation of the most productive commissioners. HousE REPORT, supra
at 13.
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scope of powers than their predecessors to relieve judges of a variety
of time-consuming duties.24 Furthermore, the particular need of
some districts to use magistrates to expedite the processing of ha-
beas corpus petitions is evidenced by the number of districts which
gave magistrates powers to conduct evidentiary hearings prior to the
Wedding decision.2s Moreover, persons seeking habeas relief would
benefit from evidentiary hearings commenced earlier and conducted
more thoroughly.26
24. The primary adjudicatory function exercised by commissioners was the conduct of
petty offense trials within the federal system. See Clark, supra note 23, at 1175. Magistrates,
however, not only conduct trials of petty offenses under section 3401 of the federal criminal
code, 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1970), see also notes 74-75 infra & accompanying text, but they also
may review applications for posttrial relief in criminal cases, conduct pretrial discovery in
civil and criminal cases, and perform any other additional duties assigned by the district
court judges. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1970). See generally House REPORT, supra note 23.
25. Local rules allowing evidentiary hearings include: E.D. LA. R. 24(C)(3)(a); W.D. Mo.
R. 26(B)(5)(e); E.D.N.C.R. 19(1)(a); E.D. VA. R. 29(A)(1)(f). Local rules which could be
interpreted as allowing magistrates to conduct habeas evidentiary hearings include: D.C.
CoNN. RuLEs F R UN D STATES MAGISTRATSs R. 1(E); D.C. KAN. R. 23A(4); S.D.N.Y.R.
35(a); R.I.R. 32(a)(4).
The Wedding majority argued that statistics demonstrated that each judge, on the average,'
spent a minimal amount of time conducting habeas evidentiary hearings, 94 S. Ct. at 2849
n.20; Chief Justice Burger in his dissent, however, noted that applications for postconviction
relief are not filed evenly throughout the country. 94 S. Ct. at 2851 n.3. In the past, 11 districts
have handled over 54 percent of all petitions filed in one year. Note, The Burden of Federal
Habeas Corpus Petitions From State Prisoners, 52 VA. L. Rnv. 486, 494, 506 (1966). While
particular districts may have hundreds of applications, others may have relatively few. Id.
Consequently, per capita statistical analysis can be deceptive in assessing the problem of
processing habeas petitions.
Habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners increased from 560 in 1950 to 871 in 1960 to 9,063
in 1970, with slight decreases to 8,372 in 1971 and 7,949 in 1972. Shapiro, Federal Habeas
Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARv. L. Rav. 321, 321 (1973). Two Supreme Court
decisions were instrumental in causing the increase: Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1
(1963) (permitting federal judges the discretion to hear successive petitions from the same
prisoner); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (exhaustion of state remedies requires only that
applicant use available remedies before applying for federal habeas corpus). See also Town-
send v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (criteria for requiring evidentiary hearing); Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443 (1953) (availability of federal habeas corpus to relitigate constitutional ques-
tions).
Many applications for postconviction relief are frivolous. Note, Proposed Reformation of
Federal Habeas Corpus Procedure: Use of Federal Magistrates, 54 IowA L. Rav. 1147, 1148
(1969). Further, some petitions are repetitious; one prisoner, for example, filed fifty applica-
tions with a district court within five years. Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945). See generally Williamson, Federal Habeas Corpus: Limita-
tions on Successive Applications from the Same Prisoner, 15 WM. & MARY L. Ray. 265 (1973).
26. One of the purposes originally advanced for the passage of the Federal Magistrates Act
was to allow "considered and unhurried judgment" on matters to which judges may devote
very little time. In his remarks accompanying the introduction of the original bill, Senator
346
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The seemingly obvious method to obtain these benefits would be
for Congress to amend section 636(b)(3) explicitly to allow magis-
trates to conduct evidentiary hearings in habeas proceedings. Nev-
ertheless, as the Supreme Court noted in Wedding, Congress pre-
viously considered and rejected such a provision. The original draft
of section 636(b)(3) provided for magistrates to give "preliminary
consideration of applications for post-trial relief made by individu-
als convicted of criminal offenses." 2s Responding to this provision,
as well as other proposed provisions of section 636(b), the Commit-
tee on the Administration of Criminal Laws of the Judicial Confer-
ence stated: "[Tihe enumeration of duties in Section 636(b) as now
worded presents a delegation which is so broad as to make this
subsection vulnerable to possible constitutional attack .... "21 An
Assistant Attorney General expressed more specific doubts about
the constitutionality of the proposed section 636(b)(3): "[Ihf pre-
liminary consideration is intended to involve adjudication, it should
be handled by an Article 3 judge.""0 Subsequent redrafting of the
provision resulted in its present form, including the limiting phrase
Joseph Tydings stated:
[WV]e feel that it is unreasonable to expect the presently overworked district
judges to discharge additional functions-such as deciding whether there is
probable cause for a warrant to issue-with the kind of considered and unhur-
ried judgment which such decisions require.... A decision to deprive a citizen
of his liberty-even though it is temporary and subject to subsequent review-or
a decision to permit the search of a citizen's home, deserves careful considera-
tion by a judicial officer whose primary attention is not lodged elsewhere. We
believe that as a practical matter a district judge cannot and should not be that
judicial officer, and that such functions can best be performed by an officer who
is a part of an upgraded version of the U.S. commissioner system.
112 CONG. REc. 12,471 (1966).
Allowing magistrates to process habeas petitions also could increase the number of hear-
ings. Senator Tydings argued that under the present system the judges' law clerks are often
the ones who screen petitions or discovery papers: "We say that the magistrate should be able
to [hold] plenary, discovery hearings. Now, what happens . . as a practical matter, you
get no hearings. The law clerk reviews the papers . . . so we are giving the individual
[petitioner] actually an opportunity. . . for more consideration than he gets now." Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Committee on the
Judiciary on S. 3475 and S. 945, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings].
27. See 94 S. Ct. at 2848-49.
28. S. 3475, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 636(b)(3) (1966).
29. Committee on the Administration of the Criminal Law, Judicial Conference of the
United States, Report (September, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Report on Criminal Law],
quoted in TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348, 356 (7th Cir. 1972).
30. Senate Hearings, supra note 26, at 130 (remarks of Assistant Attorney General Vinson).
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"as to whether there should be a hearing" to specify clearly that the
responsibility for both the final decision-and the conduct of hearings
on habeas applications belonged to the judge rather than the
magistrate.3 ' Also, to shelter section 636(b) from future criticism,
the Senate Report accompanying the bill stated that the section
"cannot be read in derogation of the fundamental responsibility of
judges to decide the cases before them; instead, it contemplates
assignments to magistrates under circumstances where the ultimate.
decision of the case is reserved to the judge, except in those instan-
ces where action can properly be taken by a nonarticle In judge." 32
The congressional fear of an unconstitutional delegation of judi-
cial power emerging from this legislative history is premised upon
article III, which provides: "The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish." Life tenure and nonreducible compensation are reserved for
article III judges to place them beyond the reach of political and
pecuniary pressures.3 4 Because federal magistrates are not life ten-
ured and because Congress can reduce their compensation, they do
not share all of the characteristics of traditional article II judges;"
thus any delegation of article III power to them arguably would be
unconstitutional.
This syllogistic argument, however, is overly simplistic, if not
31. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1970). See Report on Criminal Law, supra note 29, quoted in
Wingo v. Wedding, 94 S. Ct. 2842, 2849 (1974).
32. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 26-27. For an examination of the legislative history
of the Magistrates Act in relation to magistrates' ability to decide motions to dismiss, see
TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348, 350-60 (7th Cir. 1972).
33. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1.
34. Id. The purpose of these protections was to shelter the courts from the influence of the
executive and legislative branches. The Court of Appeals for Seventh Circuit has noted:
Among the grievances against George III detailed in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence was that "[h]e has made judges dependent on his will alone, for the
tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries." Hamilton
urged that "complete independence of the courts of justice is particularly essen-
tial" and that independence be assured by life tenure (The Federalist No. 78)
and by fixed provision for support which shall not be diminished during continu-
ance in office (The Federalist No. 79).
TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348, 353 n.25 (7th Cir. 1972). Cf. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530 (1962) (independence of decisionmaker as a criterion for recognizing Article III
judge).
35. Dye v. Cowan, 472 F.2d 1206, 1206 n.1 (6th Cir. 1972); Ingram v. Richardson, 471 F.2d




fallacious, for two reasons. First, it fails to distinguish properly judi-
cial power from judicial functions, the latter perhaps being delega-
ble without delegation of the former." Second, the syllogism fails to
address the multi-dimensional nature of article IT as establishing a
separate branch of government under the doctrine of separation of
powers as well as being associated with procedural rights.:"
To provide a decentralization of powers, the first three articles of
the Constitution establish three separate branches of government:
legislative, executive, and judicial."' Although the judicial power is
to be exercised by the courts, 9 other branches of government, as well
86. Judicial power can be defined as the authority vested in article I courts ultimately to
decide the outcome of cases or controversies arising under the Constitution and laws of the
United States. A judicial function, on the other hand, is a technique or process whereby a
judicial decision is made. See Force, Administrative Adjudication of Traffic Violations Con-
fronts the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 49 Tum. L. REv. 84, 94 (1974). It also has been
noted that administrative agencies mayperform the judicial function of adjudicating disputes
between parties so long as judicial power over such disputes is retained through the right of
appeal to an article III court. Id. at 93-98; Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in
Massachusetts, 87 HRnv. L. Rsv. 321, 365 (1973).
37. In establishing a separate branch of government, article III assures each citizen a class
of adjudicators beyond the influence of the legislative and executive branches. See note 34
supra. Law enforcement and prosecution therefore are segregated from the judicial branch.
This deconcentration of powers allows for impartial arbiters, thereby implementing a "goal
of fairness" by affording parties in litigation the due process right of uninfluenced determina-
tion of disputed issues. Force, supra note 36, at 90. See also notes 47-58 infra & accompanying
text. The syllogistic argument, see notes 33-35 supra & accompanying text, arguably fails to
recognize that this goal of fairness may be realized by having impartial and informed magis-
trates adjudicate disputed issues so long as judicial power is maintained in article III judges
through the right of appeal.
38. The opening sentence of each article seemingly vests the whole power therein granted
to that branch covered by the article. For example, the second article begins: "The executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States ofAmerica." U.S. CONST. art. IT, §
1. Nevertheless, Justice Story noted:
[WI]hen we speak of the separation of the three great powers of government,
and maintain that that separation is indispensable to public liberty, we are to
understand this maxim in a limited sense. It is not meant to affirm, that they
must be kept wholly and entirely separate and distinct, and have no common
link of connexion or dependence, the one upon the other, in the slightest degree.
The true meaning is, that the whole power of one of these departments should
not be exercised by the same hands, which possess the whole power of either of
the other departments; and that such exercise of the whole would subvert the
principles of a free constitution.
2 J. STORY, COMWNTARMES ON THE CONSTMMON OF TE UNrrED STATES § 524 (De Capo ed.
1970). See Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902). See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952). It should be noted that the Constitution does not use
the explicit phrase "separation of powers" and that the doetrine therefore exists "[i]n the
framework of our Constitution." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra at 587.
39. There can be no total usurpation of judicial power by the legislative or executive
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as many nonarticle III judges, do exercise judicial functions in mak-
ing certain-adjudicatory decisions. Determinations of rights or sta-
tus in the nature of adjudications take place in administrative agen-
cies and commissions.0 Within the judicial branch, bankruptcy ref-
erees, who are neither life tenured nor permanently salaried, exer-
cise adjudicatory functions in bankruptcy cases.' Also, territorial
branches. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 120 (1946); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,
56-57 (1932); Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). See also La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.,
352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957); Doyle, Implementing the Federal Magistrates Act, 39 J.B.A. KAN.
25, 29, 66 (1970). But see Senate Hearings, supra note 26, at 246-56; Note, Masters and
Magistrates in the Federal Courts, 88 HARv. L. Rav. 779, 780-89 (1975).
40. For instance, objections to orders issued pursuant to the Fair Packaging and Labeling
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (1970), may be adjudicated before a Federal Trade Commission
administrative law judge. 16 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1974). Such a judge has complete independence
from the investigative and prosecutorial branches of the commission. Id. § 3.42(f). He func-
tions as a trial judge in administering oaths and affirmations, issuing subpoenas, initiating
deposition proceedings, ruling upon offers of proof and receiving evidence, regulating the
course of the hearings, holding conferences for any proper purpose, ruling upon all motions
appropriate to an adjudicative proceeding, and filing initial decisions. Id. § 3.42(c). These
decisions are appealable to the full Commission, id. §§ 3.46, 3.52-.55, the decision on appeal
to the Commission becoming final if not appealed to a circuit court of appeals within 60 days.
Federal Trade Commission Act §§ 5(c), (g), 15 U.S.C. § 45(c), (g) (1970).
Other administrative agencies also perform adjudicatory functions. See, e.g., Communica-
tions Act of 1934 § 309(e), 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970) (Federal Communications Commission
hearing when substantial and material question of fact pertaining to license application is
presented); Interstate Commerce Act § 5(15), 49 U.S.C. § 5(15) (1970) (Interstate Commerce
Commission determinations of questions of fact regarding competition among carriers after
full hearing). See generally 3 K. DAvis, ADmNISTATIE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.12, 8.01-.20 (1958);
L. JAFmEE, JUDICIL CONTROL OF ADmman vAEW ACTION 87-99 (abr. student ed. 1965); Force,
supra note 36, at 94-96.
41. Bankruptcy referees are judicial officers, Bankruptcy Act § 1(22), 11 U.S.C. § 1(22)
(1970), who exercise article III judicial functions. Section 38 of the Bankruptcy Act invests
jurisdiction in referees, "subject always to a review by the judge," to "perform such duties
as are by [the Bankruptcy] Act conferred on courts of bankruptcy . . . ... 11 U.S.C. § 66
(1970). District court clerks, upon receiving voluntary petitions in bankruptcy, refer the
petitioners to referees, unless otherwise directed by the judge, id. § 45, and the referees will
either allow or dismiss the discharge in bankruptcy, id. § 66(2). An appeal to a bankruptcy
judge is permitted if made within 10 days after the referee's decision; otherwise the decision
is final. Id. § 67(c).
Although the bankruptcy courts themselves traditionally are deemed within the judicial
branch of government (under article III), the constitutional basis for bankruptcy courts is in
article I under the power given to Congress "[to establish. . . uniform Laws on the subject
of Bankruptcies . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. It has been argued that "[djesp'te the
Judiciary's historical use of referees in bankruptcy, their constitutional legitimacy has never
been determined by the Supreme Court." HousE REPORT, supra note 23, at 46 (Representative
Cahill dissenting from the approval of the Magistrates Act). Performance of article I1 func-
tions for a number of years alone may not mean that such a practice will withstand constitu-
tional challenge, cf. Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342, 352 (1941), but constitutional chal-
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judges, who exercise article IH functions, are not article DI judges.2
In situations such as labor contract bargaining, individuals can con-
sent to adjudications by arbitrators, wh6 can be individuals wholly
separate from government, yet courts will allow them to exercise
what could be deemed Article HI functions.13 In all of these instan-
ces, ultimate resort to courts by some means of judicial review is
available.-" Although the various individuals who are not article III
judges exercise adjudicatory functions, judicial review ensures that
courts will maintain ultimate judicial power. In like manner, for
lenges to the use of referees have not been upheld. See, e.g., Chase Capital Corp. v. Bumb,
336 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 934 (1965).
42. In Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), the Court in discussing Chief Justice
Marshall's decision in American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828), noted that
Canter stands for the position that "in the territories cases and controversies falling within
the enumeration of Article MI may be heard and decided in courts constituted without regard
to the limitations of that article; courts, that is, having judges of limited tenure and entertain-
ing business beyond the range of conventional cases and controversies." Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, supra at 545 (footnote omitted). The Court in Glidden noted that such a delegation
of article II functions to a nonarticle IM officer was upheld because the realities of territorial
governments, unforeseen by the framers of article III, made implementation of article MI
courts within those governments unduly burdensome on the federal system; accordingly,
Chief Justice Marshall, cognizant "of his responsibility to see the Constitution work," upheld
the constitutionality of these territorial courts on basically pragmatic grounds. Id. at 546-47.
Procedural rights, however, still must be afforded. Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S.
516, 526-28 (1905).
43. The parties to collective bargaining agreements essentially waive their rights to an
initial adjudication of any contractual dispute which may arise, since, once a dispute has been
adjudicated by an arbitrator, courts will review the award only to ensure that it "draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement" and that "the arbitrator's words manifest
[no] infidelity to [his] obligation." United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
44. See Bankruptcy Act § 39c, 11 U.S.C. § 67(c) (1970) (petitioner in bankruptcy proceed-
ing may request review of referee's decision by bankruptcy judge); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530, 545 n.13 (1962) (discussing territorial courts subject to federal-question appel-
late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (arbitration award subject to review although on limited
grounds).
Justice Brandeis has stated:
The supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity to have some
court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied; and whether the
proceeding in which the facts were adjudicated were conducted regularly. To
that extent, the person asserting a right, whatever its source, should be entitled
to the independent judgment of a court on the ultimate question of constitution-
ality. But the supremacy of law does not demand that the correctness of every
finding of fact to which the rule of law is to be applied shall be subject to review
by a court. . . .The Constitution contains no such demand.
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (concurring opinion). See
also Force, supra note 36, at 129-31.
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Congress to authorize magistrates to exercise adjudicatory functions
should not affront the doctrine of separation of powers,4 5 at least so
long as ultimate judicial power is reserved to judges by providing
for review of the magistrate's findings by the district or circuit
court. 6
Besides establishing the judicial branch of government in con-
formity with the doctrine of separation of powers, article III evinces
a procedural dimension as a standard for due process which may
have particular relevance in habeas corpus proceedings. Although
the Supreme Court in Wedding intentionally withheld decision on
any constitutional questions, 8 it intimated that certain procedural
rights may be associated with article III in habeas corpus proceed-
ings. "
45. Use of magistrates to perform judicial functions is not wholly inimical to the accom-
plishment of one of the results of the doctrine of separation of powers, the creation of a class
of disinterested arbiters. By securing judges in their positions and salaries for life, the Consti-
tution places them beyond the control that the executive or legislative branches could exercise
if judges were elected, subject to reappointment to spedified terms by elected officials, or
susceptible to financial pressures. See notes 34, 37 supra. Some protection against these
pressures also is afforded to magistrates by statute. Although appointed only for terms of
eight years rather than having life tenure, 28 U.S.C. § 631(e) (1970), appointment and re-
moval of magistrates is performed by the district judges, not by a legislature or the electorate.
Id. §§ 631(a), (h). Some protection against financial pressure is given despite the fact that
the range of salaries is determined by Congress, id. § 634(a); section 633(c) of the Act gives
the judiciary effective control over magistrate salaries by allowing only the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, upon recommendation of the Director of the Federal Judicial
Center, to alter salaries already set. Furthermore, the salary of an individual magistrate
cannot be reduced during the term of his appointment. Id. § 634(b).
The Magistrates Act requires all magistrates to be attorneys unless it is impossible for the
district court to find an attorney to fill a particular position. Id. § 631(b)(1). Under the
commissioner system almost one-third of the over 700 commissioners were nonlawyers; in
creating the new position of magistrate with its greater attendant responsibilities, Congress
recognized that such officers would have to apply sophisticated rules of constitutional law
and determined that members of the bar are more capable of meeting such demands. Houss
REPoRT, supra note 23, at 13. Magistrates are bound by the oaths of justices and judges as
prescribed by section 453 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §§ 453, 631(f) (1970).
46. In Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932), the Court noted: "[Tihere is no require-
ment that, in order to maintain the essential attributes of the judicial power, all determina-
tions of fact in constitutional courts shall be made by judges." Indeed, one commentator has
stated: "[Ejspecially in view of the absence of any right to jury trial in such cases, I think
Congress could create an administrative agency to process all state prisoner habeas corpus
applications, at least so long as judicial review is available." Shapiro, supra note 36, at 365
(footnote omitted). But see Note, The Validity of United States Magistrates' Criminal
Jurisdiction, 60 VA. L. Rxv. 697, 702 (1974).
47. See Force, supra note 36, at 90-93, 119-128. See also TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d
348, 354 n.37 (1972).
48. 94 S. Ct. at 2847 n.4.
49. The language which the Court used to deny any expression of opinion on the constitu-
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First, the Court relied heavily upon the rationale of Holiday u.
Johnston'O in which the Court had disallowed habeas factfinding by
commissioners because the controlling statute required a "court,
justice, or judge" to hear and determine evidence.' Although con-
cluding that the statute by itself granted to prisoners the right of
testifying before a judge rather than a master or commissioner,.2 the
reasoning in Holiday indicates that such a right also may be ac-
corded to prisoners by the Constitution. In Wedding the Court de-
clined to infer that a change in the habeas corpus procedure statute
from "court, justice, or judge" to "court" had expanded the lan-
guage so as to include magistrates. 3 Since magistrates were not
deemed within the meaning of the term "courts" for purposes of
statutory construction, it can be argued that they would not be
within the term "inferior Courts" as provided in article I for pur-
poses of constitutional construction. Thus under the constitution,
also, a prisoner could have the procedural right to testify before a
judge.
Moreover, the Court in Wedding emphasized the crucial role of
factfinding in habeas corpus proceedings, asserting: "More often
than not, claims of unconstitutional detention turn upon the resolu-
tion of contested issues of fact."5' The Court further stated that
"'[o]ne of the essential elements of the determination of the cru-
cial facts is the weighing and appraising of the testimony.' , It
concluded that merely listening to recordings of testimony would
not be "'in the light of the purpose and object of the proceeding,
the equivalent of the judge's own exercise of the function of the trier
of the facts.' " This reasoning suggests a need for an article IH
tional issue is in itself an indication of the Court's feeling: "We indicate no views as to the
validity of investing [authority to hold evidentiary hearings] in a magistrate or other officer
'outside the pale of Article III of the Constitution."' 94 S. Ct. at 2847 n.4, quoting Wedding
v. Wingo, 483 F.2d 1131, 1133 n.1 (6th Cir. 1973). By so readily placing magistrates "outside
the pale" of Article Ill, the Court may have displayed a willingness to declare any delegation
of judicial authority to them unconstitutional.
50. 313 U.S. 342 (1941).
51. The habeas proceeding in Holiday was governed by the Act of June 28, 1874, ch. 13, §
761, 18 Stat. 142 (Rev. Stat. § 761), the predecessor of the section, 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970),
which the Wedding decision found inconsistent with the Magistrates Act. See notes 16-22
supra & accompanying text.
52. 313 U.S. at 352, 354.
53. See note 17 supra & accompanying text.
54. 94 S. Ct. at 2847.
55. Id. at 2850, quoting Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342, 352 (1941).
56. 94 S. Ct. at 2850, quoting Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342, 352 (1941).
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judge to conduct a postconviction hearing in order for him to see and
hea5 7 the witnesses to provide due process to the petitioner."
Nevertheless, designing a constitutional procedure which will per-
mit magistrates to conduct evidentiary hearings in habeas corpus
proceedings may be possible. One such procedure would be to pro-
vide de novo hearings in the district court of any finding of fact to
which objection is taken by a petitioner. Such a procedure was held
constitutionally valid by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
in Noorlander v. Ciccone,"5 although rejected by the Supreme Court
57. The Court more precisely asserted the "see and hear" doctrine in United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 341 (1949), where it stated: "Findings as to the design, motive
and intent with which men act depend peculiarly upon the credit given those witnesses by
those who see and hear them." Such a principle also may lie at the root of rule 52(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in pertinent part: "Findings of fact shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). In Borden
Co. v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 369 F.2d 96, 101 (3rd Cir. 1966), quoting Steiner v. Mitchell,
215 F.2d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1954), the court reviewed a patent infingement decision, stating:
"Since the evidence here is all documentary. . . . 'the findings of the District Court are
deprived of the degree of finality which would otherwise attach under Rule 52.'" Accord,
Harris v. United States, 370 F.2d 887, 894 (4th Cir. 1966); Falkerberg v. Golding, 195 F.2d
482, 486 (7th Cir. 1971). But see 5A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 52.04 (2d ed. 1974). Rule
52(a) concerns only appeals within article M courts, but its recognition of the importance that
is placed on demeanor evidence in the factfinding process suggests that due process rights
may be infringed when such evidence is taken by a nonarticle III judge in adjudicating
primary individual freedoms. Cf. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 604-06 (1962) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting).
58. Procedural due process rights may be enforced more stringently in proceedings affect-
ing bodily freedom than in proceedings affecting strictly pecuniary interests; in Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 398-99, 426-34 (1963), the Supreme Court strongly implied that habeas corpus
may be an inviolable constitutional right which could not be diminished by statutes. But see
Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CAIF.
L. REv. 335 (1952). The constitutional basis for the writ of habeas corpus is not the Bill of
Rights, but article I in which the power is denied to Congress to suspend the writ except in
cases of rebellion or invasion when the public safety may require such a suspension. U.S.
CoNsTr. art. I, § 9.
Possibly underlying the Wedding reasoning is the recognition that if an action "is to be
managed with sensitivity both to the plaintiff's reasonable demands and to the defendants'
responsibilities, the district judge must keep close to the heart of litigation. Delegations of
discrete chores to a magistrate must not be permitted to cause the judge to lose the feel of
the pulse of the proceedings." Yaffee v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1367 (1st Cir. 1972).
A rule proposed by a committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States, however,
would permit district courts to authorize magistrates to conduct evidentiary hearings in
habeas matters, subject only to the limitation that the magistrates not be able to issue an
order disposing of a petition. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial
Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules Governing Habeas
Corpus Proceedings for the United States District Courts, Rule 11 (January 31, 1973).
59. 489 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1973).
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in Wedding on the same statutory grounds which invalidated the
Wedding district court rule." The court of appeals in Noorlander
did not articulate a two-dimensional characterization of article IH,
but concluded that so long as the due process right to a hearing
before an article I judge ultimately was protected, a local rule
providing trial de novo would withstand an attack premised upon
an assertion of improper delegation of powers.'
The court of appeals essentially had laid the groundwork for this
confrontation in Bridwell v. Ciccone,6" wherein it reviewed a local
rule, noting: "We understand the rule to provide each petitioner
with the right to a de novo evidentiary hearing by a District Court
judge in every case in which a timely objection is taken to a finding
on a material issue of fact. It, thus, insures that the ultimate deci-
sion in every case will be made by the District Court judge."83 The
procedure was outlined further in Noorlander:
A petitioner is always entitled to take exceptions to material
issues of fact and conclusions of law. If he takes exception to the
former, an Article I judge will personally take the testimony
of the witnesses, determine their credibility and decide for him-
self what the facts are. If the exceptions are only as to the con-
clusions to be drawn from undisputed material facts, the judge
will again decide for himself what the proper procedure is."
The Noorlander court recognized the right of a petitioner to have his
hearing conducted by an article III judge in a trial de novo, preserv-
ing the "see and hear" principle of decisionmaking.65 If the right to
have the judge see and hear the proceeding was not demanded ini-
60. 94 S. Ct. at 2849 n.19.
61. 489 F.2d at 648.
62. 490 F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1973). Bridwell was decided on Dec. 11, 1973, id. at 310;
Noorlander, on Dec. 27, 1973, 489 F.2d at 642.
63. Id. at 314.
64. Id. at 648. The Noorlander rule is similar to a delegation of function upheld by the
Supreme Court in Ex Parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920), in which a district judge had
appointed an auditor to conduct a preliminary investigation as to the facts of a case, listen
to witnesses, and file a report. Upholding the procedure despite an argument that it worked
a deprival of the seventh amendment right to jury trial, the Court noted that the delegation
was not absolute, but qualified to preserve ultimate decisionmaking power in the jury: '"The
report will, unless rejected by the court, be admitted at the jury as evidence of facts and
findings embodied therein; but it will be treated, at most, as prima facie evidence thereof.
The parties remain as free to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses as if the report had
not been made." Id. at 310-11.
65. See note 57 supra & accompanying text.
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tially by the petitioner, it was protected, nonetheless, because a
hearing before the judge still could be obtained after the magis-
trate's hearing. The court made this point explicit by asserting that
the right to a trial de novo was unqualified and by striking down
the local rule provision which dictated to the contrary."
Even if Congress acted to overcome the statutory grounds for
invalidation of magistrate hearings in postconviction cases, a trial
de novo system might be inadequate to unclog judicial machinery.
Although the court in Noorlander contended that the local rule
provided "a convenient, quick and efficient method of sorting out
the legal and factual issues,"67 the rule in fact may add yet another
delay before final adjudication, since the prisoner would be likely
to appeal any adverse factual decision by a magistrate." Further,
the hearing before the magistrate could become a testing ground for
the petitioner, wherein defenses and tactics could be refined in prep-
aration for the "real" confrontation before the district judge. As an
answer to the problem of crowded dockets, the Noorlander method
of trial de novo therefore would seem ineffective.
A more appropriate solution would be a system of consensual
reference to magistrates for evidentiary hearings69 following waiver
by the petitioner of the procedural rights associated with the use of
an article IT judge.7 0 Evidentiary hearings held upon consensual
reference could protect the rights of the petitioner in habeas corpus
proceedings as well as expedite the judicial process. To allow addi-
tional safeguards for both the petitioner and the integrity of the
judicial system, the consent of the district court and the governmen-
66. In discussing Western District of Missouri Rule 26(a), the court stated: "It provides
for a de novo review whenever a timely exception to a material fact is made 'unless the district
judge directs otherwise' and for an evidentiary hearing 'when appropriate or required by law.'
These limitations impose impermissible conditions on the right to a de novo review, and to
an evidentiary hearing before the district court to resolve disputed material factual ques-
tions." 489 F.2d at 649.
67. Id. at 648.
68. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1038, 1189
n.230 (1970).
69. Only very recently have questions arisen as to the constitutionality of consensual refer-
ence. Much of this criticism has resulted from a reaction to the inadequate qualifications of
masters and commissioners (a deficiency remedied by the Federal Magistrates Act) and from
a misinterpretation of the development of consensual reference. For a discussion in support
of consensual reference, see Comment, An Adjudicative Role for Federal Magistrates in Civil
Cases, 40 U. CHi. L. REv. 584 (1973); Senate Hearings, supra note 26, at 251-53.
70. See notes 47-58 supra & accompanying text.
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tal defendant also could be required." Support for the use of a
system of consensual reference exists in early master law. Justice
Field, in 1889, wrote:
[Wihen the parties consent to the reference of a case to a mas-
ter or other officer to hear and decide all the issues therein, and
report his findings, both of fact and of law, and such reference
is entered as a rule of the court, the master is clothed with very
different powers from those which he exercises upon ordinary
references, without such consent. . . . A reference by consent
of parties, of an entire case for the determination of all its issues
. . . is a submission of the controversy to a tribunal of the par-
ties' own selection, to be governed in its conduct by the ordinary
rules applicable to the administration of justice in tribunals
established by law.
2
Consensual reference is also in harmony with the procedural
structure and policy objectives of the Magistrates Act. The sub-
committee memorandum which accompanied the Act stated that
"[t]he use of magistrates for duties that do not require the employ-
ment of an article II judge, or in cases in which the parties consent
to the use of a magistrate, may do much to increase the efficiency
of the Federal Courts." 3 Support for the incorporation of a system
of consensual reference into the Act likewise can be found within
the Act itself in section 636(a)(3), which gives the magistrate the
power to conduct trials of minor offenses under section 3401(a) of
the federal criminal code.74 Section 3401(b) provides that after
careful explanation by the magistrate of the right to trial by judge
and jury, a petitioner, by signing a written consent to trial by a
magistrate, may waive "both a trial before a judge of the district
court and any right to trial by jury that he may have." s If a magis-
trate can make the ultimate decision in misdemeanor cases within
the Constitution, surely magistrates also can hold evidentiary hear-
71. The reasons for requiring such consent are two-fold. First, when the dockets are not
crowded, the desire to prevent forum-shopping abuses, which could delay proceedings, might
cause the Government and the district court to disfavor reference. Second, requiring the
court's consent for reference would assure responsible article III supervision over the reference
system to prevent governmental abuses, such as the exaction of uninformed waiver from
petitioners.
72. Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 524 (1889).
73. Senate Hearings, supra note 26, at 14 (emphasis supplied).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(a) (1970).
75. Id. § 3401(b).
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ings to make recommendations to the ultimate decisionmaker under
a system of consensual reference. Although Congress may not wish
to go so far as to abandon the requirement that a judge ultimately
decide the freedom of an imprisoned individual, it should be able
to provide a method of consensual reference for evidentiary hear-
ings.76
Inherent in a system of consensual reference is a flexibility that
would facilitate efficient processing of habeas corpus petitions.
When court dockets are not overburdened, a petitioner likely would
come before the district judge, since no reason would exist for refer-
ral. Should the docket be crowded, however, the judge and prosecu-
tor could afford the petitioner the opportunity to have a magistrate
conduct the hearing. The inducement for the petitioner to consent
is that, in the context of a crowded district court docket, the magis-
trate's hearing would present an earlier chance for freedom. By this
method of waiver and consent, no party would be denied the right
to come before an article hII judge, yet judicial processing of habeas
petitions could be expedited.
CONCLUSION
Because the attempt to permit magistrates to conduct habeas
corpus evidentiary proceedings was deficient statutorily, the Su-
preme Court in Wingo v. Wedding reserved consideration of consti-
tutional issues, although intimating that such issues might be pres-
76. To adopt a system of consensual reference, Congress should grant explicitly to magis-
trates the function of holding evidentiary hearings by consensual reference in section 636(a)
of the Magistrates Act. This direct delegation under section 636(a) would be more advanta-
geous than amending section 636(b) to treat habeas corpus functions as additional duties.
As an additional duty assigned by a judge, the holding of evidentiary hearings might take on
the appearance of a judicial abdication of power, rather than being recognized as a specific
establishment of a judicial function in magistrates by Congress.
Section 2243 of the Judicial Code, id. § 2243, also would have to be amended; it stands as
an impediment to any attempt to establish a system of consensual reference following the
interpretation given to the term "court" in the Wedding decision. See notes 16-19 supra &
accompanying text. To allow magistrates to hold evidentiary hearings, the last sentence of
section 2243 should be amended to read: "The court or magistrate shall summarily hear and
determine the facts, and the court shall dispose of the matter as law and justice require."
Should Congress deem initial dispositions of habeas corpus petitions appropriate for magis-
trates upon consensual reference, more extensive changes would be needed in the entire
section 2243, but the last sentence would establish conclusively that the function could be
handled.by magistrates if it read as follows: "The court or magistrate shall summarily hear
and determine the facts and dispose of the matter as law and justice require." In addition, a
statement that the procedure should comply with the consensual reference system of section
636(a) should be included to preclude statutory inconsistency.
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ent. Delegation of the factfinding function to magistrates should not
be deemed violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, how-
ever, once judicial function is distinguished from judicial power.
Moreover, although the Wedding reasoning suggests the existence
of procedural rights associated with article I, Congress can devise
a procedure for consensual reference to magistrates upon waiver of
those procedural rights. The Noorlander solution arguably avoided
unconstitutionality through a trial de novo procedure, but such a
solution most likely would fail to relieve the district courts of the
burden which the local rule provision was designed to overcome. A
system of consensual reference would offer a habeas corpus petition
procedure that is both constitutional and expedient.
